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II 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT #1 DID THE JUSTICE COURT HAVE PLENERY JURISDICTION TO 
ADJUDICATE THIS CAUSE? 
POINT #2 DOES ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW? 
POINT #3 WAS THE APPELLANT GI\EN A LAWFUL ORDER PURSUANT TO U.C.A. 
SECTION 41-6-13, FOR WHICH HE COULD BE CHARGED WITH FAILING 
TO OBEY? 
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Ill 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION; 
Article I, Section 1: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right." 
Article I, Section 2: 
"All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require." 
Article I, Section 10: 
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
casesp a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of in-
ferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civ"., 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Article I, Section 12: 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense." 
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION: (continued) 
Article I, Section 14: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized." 
Article I, Section 10: 
"All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution 
or by the laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon 
the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe 
the following oath or affirmation:" 
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey 
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of this State, and that I will discharge the duties 
of my office with fidelity." 
Article VIII, Section 9« 
"From all final judgments of the district courts, there 
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal 
shall be upon the record made in the court below and under such 
regulations as may be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal 
may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the 
appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also 
lie from, the final orders and decrees of the Court in the admin-
istration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as 
shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final 
judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases tc 
the District Courts on both questions of law and fact, with such 
limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the 
decision of the District Courts on such appeals shall be final, 
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of 
a statute." 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
Article VI, paragraph 2: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: (continued) 
AMMENDMENT V: 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in joepardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation." 
xi 
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Appellant's Brief - page 1 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case, based on the allegation that the 
Appellant violated certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code of 
the State of Utah. The Appellant was charged and covicted of 
five (5) class B misdemeanors all arising from a single episode. 
The charges being; Count I: Failure to comply with the lawful order 
of a police officer, contrary to Section 41-6-13, U.C.A. Count II; 
Failure to produce a driver's license, contrary to Section 41-2-15, 
U.C.A. (Count II was brought in the Justice Court and dismissed 
in the District Court) Count II: (New charge brought in the District 
Court, replacing the charge dismissed) Operation of a motor vehicle 
without a license, contrary to Section 41-2-2, U.C.A. Count III: 
Operation of an unsafe motor vehicle, contrary to Section 41-6-117 
U.C.A. Count IV: Operate without registration, contrary to Section 
41-1-18, U.C.A. Count V: Failure to display a safety inspection 
sticker, contrary to Section 41-6-158, U.C.A. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant was stopped by a Salina City policeman, (Charles 
\Aioodside) on the evening of 24 February, 1984, for alledgedly having 
a broken headlight, or broken tail lights. The Appellant was 
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Appellant's Brief - page 2 
brought before the Justice of the Peace for Salina City, Thad 
Wasden, that evening for arraignment. The Appellant was jailed 
that evening for refusing to waive his right to counsel at that 
time. The Appellant was released from jail the next day and returned 
for arraignment on 9 March 1984. After two (2) motion hearings, 
the Appellant was tried and convicted on five (5) counts for 
alledged violations of the motor vehicle code of the State of Utah. 
The Appellant appealed to the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District for Sevier County, for a review of the judgment 
in the Justice Court. The Appellant filed his Appellant's Brief 
(record pp. 137 - 157) on 13 June 1984. The District Court Judge, 
Don V. Tibbs, chose to proceed with a trial de novo, and a second 
trial was held 9 October 1984 in the Sevier County Courthouse, 
Richfield, Utah. A 6 person jury found the Appellant guilty on 
4 of the original counts and 1 new count. 
The Appellant was sentenced on 14 November 1984, and immediately 
incarcerated by order of the District Court Judge. The Appellant 
petitioned the Court at his sentencing for a certificate of probable 
cause to stay the execution of his sentence pending this appeal. 
The District Court denied the Appellant's motion, and he was 
immediately incarcerated in the Sevier County Jail. The Appellant 
sought relief from the trial Court to resentence him in accordance 
with the original sentence of the Justice Court, which was denied 
on 28 November 1984. 
On 29 November 1984, the Appellant brought an original complaint 
in this Court seeking extraordinary relief in the form of Habeas 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's Brief - page 3 
Corpus, and Mandamus, to order the District Court to resentence 
the Appellant in compliance with the law, and immediate release 
pending adjudication of the Appellant's Complaint. This Court 
issued its order to the District Court on the 6th day of December, 
1984, mandating that Court to resentence the Appellant in compliance 
with the original sentence from the Justice Court, with time already 
served to be credited to the Appellant. 
The Appellant now brings this appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah from the final judgment of the District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Appellant was sentenced in the Justice Court for the City 
of Salina to 14 days in the County jail on Counts I and II, both to 
be served concurently with each other. He was also sentenced to 
$299 fines and $6 assessment on Counts I and II, $38 for count III, 
and $30 for count IV, no sentence was imposed for count V. He 
was also sentenced to 30 days probation pending his appeal to the 
District Court. 
Following the trial de novo, the Appellant was sentenced by 
the District Court to six (6) months in the County jail for each 
of the five (5) counts which the Appellant had been found guilty 
of. Two (2) terms were to be served concurently with the other 
three, bringing the Appellant's sentence to a total of 18 months 
in the County jail. No fines were imposed. 
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The Appellant was resentenced on 9 January 1985i to comply 
with the original sentence of the Justice Court, pursuant to the 
order of this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Appellant is a natural person. (record pp. 66 - 75, 
transcript p. 43, lines 8-11) 
2. The Appellant is a Free person. (record pp. 66 - 75, 
transcript p. ^ 3» lines 8 - 11) 
3. The Appellant is entitled to, and claims all Rights, Duties, 
and Responsibilities according to his status. (record p. 66, 
transcript p. 43, lines 9 - 11) 
4. The Appellant is not engaged in trade, commerce, business, { 
or industry in his private use of the highway. (record p. 162, 
para. 6) 
5. The Appellant was not engaged in trade, commerce, business, ( 
or industry on the evening of the incident which this action arose 
from. (transcript, Appellant's testimony) 
6. This matter was first heard in the Justice Court for ( 
Salina City. (record pp. 1 & 2) 
7. The Appellant challenged the Jurisdiction of the Justice 
Court, in the Justice Court. (record pp. 95 - 97) 
8. The alledged incident occured within the corporate city 
limits of the City of Salina, County of Sevier, State of Utah. 
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9. The Appellant is not a firm, copartnership, association, 
or corporation, and is not a member of such, (record p. 66) 
10. The Appellant is not bound or obligated by any contract 
which would alter his status as it pertains to this case. (record 
pp. 66, 138 - 139, 162) 
11. The Appellant is an unenfranchised individual. (record 
pp. 66 - 75, 95 - 123, 137 - 139, 158 - 163) 
12. The Appellant is a citizen of the State of Utah. (not 
in record) 
13. The Appellant owns his property as a matter of right, 
(not in record) 
14. The Appellant has not accepted as privilege his right to 
travel, or his right to use his property. (record p. 66) 
15. The property of the Appellant is one 3/4 ^on pick up 
truck, color blue, year 1968, VIN: C2546Z125417. (not in record) 
16. The Appellant was not advised of his rights at his first 
appearance before a Magistrate. (record pp. 64 - 65) 
17. The Appellant was not advised of his rights at any 
subsequent appearance before the Magistrate. (record pp. 62, 64 - 65) 
18. The Appellant was not afforded counsel by the police 
officers at the alledged scene of the crime. (transcript pp. 136, 
149) 
19. The Appellant was refused counsel, and denied counsel of 
his choice at his first appearance before the Magistrate. (record 
pp. 64 - 65) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's Brief - page 6 
20. The Appellant's property was taken from him as punishment 
on the evening of 24 February 1984. (not in record) 
21. The Appellant has been punished for greater penalties than 
allowable by statute, (not in record) 
22. The Justice of the Peace sought legal counsel from the 
prosecutor. (no record available) 
23. The Justice Court jury voi dire was substantially weighted 
in favor of the prosecutor. (no record available) 
24. The Justice of the Peace threw away the Appellant's jury 
instructions. (no record available) 
25. The Appellant was denied his right to present testimony 
in his own behalf, in the Justice Court. (no record available) 
26. The Appellant exercised his right to privacy at the incident 
which this case arises from. (transcript p. 89, lines 9 - 13) 
27. The Appellant did not cause loss or injury to another at 
the incident which this case arises from. (transcript pp. 123 - 124, 
lines 23 - 25 & 1 - 11; p. 126, lines 1 - 24; pp. 128 - 13O5 p. 132, 
lines 13 - 19) 
28. The Justice of the Peace refused to rule on any issue in-
volving the Utah State Constitution or the U.S. Constitution. (record 
not in record) 
29. The Justice of the Peace did not uphold the oath of office 
required by Utah Constitution. 
30. There is no record that Thad Wasden ever took the oath of 
office required by Article IV, Section 10, Utah Constitution, and the 
Appellant has been refused access to said oath by Judge Wasden. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT #1 Appellant argues that the Justice Court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
POINT #2 Appellant argues that the appeals process, and the 
forum for review on appeals from the Justice Court, denies him 
equal protection of the law. 
POINT #3 Appellant argues the validity of the statute under 
which he was charged with failing to obey a lawful order. 
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Appellant's Brief - page 7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT #1 DID THE JUSTICE COURT HAVE PLENERY JURISDICTION TO 
ADJUDICATE THIS CAUSE? 
The Defendant intends to argue this point in 5 segments. He 
would contend that the Justice Court lacked the jurisdiction to 
consider this matter. The Defendant did not enter a plea in the 
Justice Court, objecting to its jurisdiction over the subject matter 
and the person of the Defendant. He likewise objected to the Justice 
of the Peace entering a plea for him, and assuming jurisdiction over 
him. The Defendant challenged jurisdiction and filed numerous 
pleadings in the Justice Court for lack of jurisdiction. (record 
pp. 95 - 123) The Justice Court, having had its jurisdiction 
challenged, simply ignored the Defendant's objections and proceded 
without answer or proof of jurisdiction. This action of itself 
denied the Court its jurisdiction, for; 
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." 
Hagens v Lavine, 415 U.S. 533, note 3 
Although the' Justice Court may have had territorial jurisdiction 
to hear a cause pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-25-1, and jurisdiction 
for appearance to a magistrate, pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-7-19, 
the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate this cause for 
the following reasons. 
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Appellant's Brief - page 8 
1. STATUS of the Defendant 
2. RIGHTS of the Defendant 
3. SUBJECT MATTER of Title kl, U.C.A. 
k. SELF IMPOSED DENIAL OF JURISDICTION by the Justice of the 
Peace 
5. THAD WASDEN is not a duly sworn Justice of the Peace 
STATUS 
To begin this argument for lack of jurisdiction in the Justice 
Court, the Defendant prays that this Court first understand the 
basis from which the Defendant claims this highly irregular status 
of "Free and Natural Citizen." To do this, the Defendant must first 
define "status", to understand the meaning of it and then apply it 
to himself. 
STATUS: The status of an individual used as a legal term, 
means the legal position of the individual in or with regard to 
the rest of the community. The rights, duties, capacities and 
incapacities which determine a person to a given class, con-
stitute his status. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (191^) p. 3129 
Derived from this definition are two very important points to 
consider. First, that there are given (separate) classes of persons; 
and second, such classes of persons are delineated by the individual's 
rights, duties, and capacities or incapacities. Consequently, the 
Defendant declares his status as a Free and Natural Citizen and 
contends that due to his status the application of Title 4lf U.C.A. 
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Appellant's Brief - page 9 
does not apply to him any more than federal imigration laws, as he 
is a U.S. Citizen, or this State's contractor's laws, as he does not 
build anything. Those laws in and of themselves may be Constitutional, 
as may Title 4l, when appropriately applied to those persons who are 
foreign to the United States in the first instance, or those persons 
involved in construction in the second. The same would be true if the 
Defendant were a banker, doctor, or partner in a business endeavor. He 
would be regulated by such laws governing those institutions. As this 
case involves Title ^1, U.C.A., and specifically those sections for 
which the Defendant was charged with having violated, the Defendant 
must show how those laws are unconstitutional in attempting to effect 
an involuntary change in his status. In addition, the Plaintiff 
never presented evidence to prove that the Defendant was of such a 
status that Title ^1 would apply to him, and the Justice Court never 
required it. Title 4l cannot apply to the Defendant without his 
consent, just as the banking & contracting laws, etc., cannot apply 
to him without his consent. 
U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t) attempts to define the Defendant, who 
is a natural person, in the same context with classes of juristic 
persons under the catch-all definition of "person". (addendum #1) 
This type of legislation attempts to lead one to the conclusion 
that all are subject to the law, and amounts to nothing more than 
legal debauchery. Such a conclusion is a fiction of law! 
The Defendant would contend that though the legislature may 
define and redefine words and meanings until their intent has lost 
all comprehension, they cannot by simple catch-all definition, alter 
or change who and what the Defendant is; and limit by such definition Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellant's Brief - page 10 
his Rights and Immunities, which are protected for him by the 
Constitution. In addition, the Defendant is not, nor can he be a 
firm, copartnership, association, or corporation, or he will cease 
to exist as a natural person. That being, a "natural person" by 
its definition. This is found in the following definition of 
"person". 
PERSON: A man considered according to the rank he holds 
in society, with all the right to which the place he holds 
entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. 
Persons are the subject of rights and duties; 
and, as a subject of a right, the person is the object of 
the correlative duty, and conversely. Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary (191*0 P- 257^ 
Every full citizen is a person; other human 
beings, namely, subjects who are not citizens, may be persons. 
But not every human being is necessarily a person, for a 
person is capable of rights and duties, and there may well be 
human beings having no legal rights, as was the case with slaves 
in English law....A person is such, not because he is human, 
but because rights and duties are ascribed to him. The person 
is the legal subject or substance of which the rights and 
duties are attributes. An individual human being considered as 
having such attributes is what lawyers call a natural person. 
Bouvier's, p. 2575 
Notice that, "A person is such, not because he is human, but 
because rights and duties are ascribed to him." In another respect, 
there may be human beings who are not "persons". Using this same 
logic5 there may be "persons" who are not "natural persons". The 
difference being the rights, duties, and capacities of one compared 
to the other. The point the Defendant makes is the consideration 
of corporations, corporate status, and human beings who have entered 
corporate status. Even though the corporation operates or functions 
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as a "person", its Rights, Duties, and Capacities are less than 
that of a "natural person" or "citizen", and there may be human 
beings who are reduced to such corporate status through contract. 
Such human beings are not natural persons, but are subjects by 
contract. Yes, they may still vote! And because of that they are 
refered to as "citizens". But, they are "subjects" through contract, 
and are subject to the same regulations that govern the corporation. 
Hence, the Defendant declares his status to be that of a 
Natural Person. He is not bound or obligated in such a way as 
to deprive him of his rights, duties, and capacities. The 
corporation, etc., has no rights, it exists under privilege as a 
creature of the State. 
Observe now the difference between a "subject" and a "citizen". 
SUBJECT: One who owes allegiance to a sovereign and is 
governed by the sovereign's laws. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 
edition, p. 1277 
An individual member of a nation, who is subject 
to the laws. This term is used in contradistinction to citizen 
which is applied to the same individual when considering his 
political rights. 
Subject is a wider term than citizen; there are 
members of the state who, by reason of natural or conventional 
disability, do not enjov full political rights. Bouvier' s, 
p. 3163 
CITIZEN: One of the sovereign people. A constitutent 
member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the people. 
Bouvierfs, p. 490 
The Defendant recognizes that the State of Utah is a sovereign. 
That sovereignty however, is limited for the protection of the 
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original sovereignty of the people. It is the people who are 
sovereign in this State. (Utah State Constitution Article I, 
Section 2, see Constitutional Provisions, this brief, p. IX 
Notice that government, i.e. the State of Utah, is founded on 
the authority which resides in the people. 
Hence, the Defendant claims his status to be that of a Natural 
Citizen. He is a natural person because of Rights, Duties, and 
Capacities; and a Citizen, when considering his political rights. 
As shown by definition, other human beings may be persons, or they 
may be subjects thru contract, or members of corporations, etc. 
If they are such however, they cannot be Natural Citizens, for they 
are "subject" to the law. Which ever that "law" is that applies 
to them. 
It may very well be within the legislature's power to define 
"person" for its application of Title kl to certain individuals. It 
cannot however, alter the status of the Defendant as a natural person 
by including natural persons with corporations, etc., in the catch-all 
manner as previously described. This is an attempt to create the 
illusion that all human beings are subject to that section of the 
Code. 
U.C.A. Section 68-3-12(5) defines "person" for general use in 
the Utah Code. (see addendum #2) 
Nowhere is there any definition of "natural person" in the Utah 
Code. It is for this reason that the Defendant turns to the Law 
Dictionary for enlightenment on the subject. In addition, the 
legislature, when using the word "person" in Title M , must consider 
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its intent and meaning when applying its use to an unenfranchised 
individual. 
There is a major difference between individuals and corporations, 
or human beings who exist in a corporate capacity, whom the Defendant 
would contend are the "persons" refered to in Title 4-1, U.C.A. 
In respect to individuals and corporations, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, (Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74) recognized the distinction 
between them, and ruled that the individual may stand on his 
constitutional rights as a citizen. The individual owes no duty to 
the state since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection 
of his life and property. And, that he owes nothing to the public, 
so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. The corporation 
cannot claim such protection, and must submit itself at the suit of 
the state. (addendum #3) 
As a Natural Person, and as a Citizen of these United States, 
and the State of Utah, the Defendant claims also to be "Free". 
Hence the addressing of his status as a Free and Natural Citizen, 
or FREEMAN. But, from whom does he derive his Free status? 
"I, the Lord God, make you free, therefore ye are free 
indeed; and the law also maketh you free." Doctrine and 
Covenants, Section 98:8 
The law which the Lord God refers to in this passage of 
scripture (ie. law), is the Constitutional law of the land, and as 
pertaining to law of man, whatsoever is more or less than this 
cometh of evil. 
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Title kl is the law of man. Its application is to compel 
specific performance on its subjects, in an effort to insure conduct 
of a moral nature, and to prevent harm or injury. 
The Defendant is already a moral being. He is endowed by his 
Creator with a conscience. As declared by his Creator, he is free, 
and is given his agency to act and to exist as a natural person. 
"The Lord said unto Enoch; Behold these thy brethren; 
they are the workmanship of mine own hands, and I gave unto 
them their knowledge, in the day I created them; and in the 
Garden of Eden, gave I unto man his agency." Moses, 7:32 
By virtue of his origin, the Defendant is free to act and 
exercise his agency. He is therefore endowed with a conscience and 
is restrained by it while exercising his agency, from trespassing on 
the rights of others. This agency is necessary in order for him to 
account to his Creator for his actions. He is given this agency by 
his Creator to chose for himself, for good or for evil. i/uhen he 
forfeits his agency, or it is taken from him, he no longer can 
account to his Creator for his acts. This is a gross deprivation of 
his right to stand before God and render an accounting over his 
stewardship during his mortal existance. This concept of agency is 
deeply embedded in the Defendant's religious upbringing, and is what 
forms his moral character. 
The founding fathers of this Country understood the need for 
man to be free, to act and to choose his own destiny. They 
understood that man was accountable for his actions, and therefore 
his agency must not be impaired. For this reason, they organized 
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and defined those provisions of their Creator in order to protect 
their agency. They were identified as Rights, endowed by their 
Creator, inherent and unalienable. These rights and immunities are 
to protect the Citizen from the stealthy encroachments on his agency 
by government, and to keep government from taking away his freedom 
and accountability to his Creator. 
The corporation however, has no conscience or moral existance. 
It is a creature of the state, and being such, the state is responsible 
for its actions. The corporation is not a moral being, it is a paper 
fiction. It has no spirit! It has no soul! It has no conscience! 
It exists forever with no accountability to God! 
Being solely a creature of the state, the state must regulate 
the corporation to insure its conduct to be that of a moral nature, 
and to insure that it does not trespass on the rights of Citizens. 
Thus the need for statutory regulation. The corporation has no 
rights inherent and unalienable. It is granted privilege. Privilege 
to exist, and to act as if it were a person. 
By defining "person" in the Motor Vehicle Code, U.C.A. Section 
4l-l-l(t), the legislature seeks to, and in effect has succeeded in 
altering the status of every natural person desiring to exercise his 
liberty, and travel by the modern conveyance of the day. The only 
reason this has been successful is because, over the years people have 
waived their rights and received for privilege the so-called "right 
to drive." Having the unlimited right to contract, they do so by 
securing a driver's license from the state. (evidence of consent) 
They purchase a motor vehicle through a bank. (a corporation) They 
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donft own their property, they only possess an equitable interest 
in it. They become a member of a corporation through contract, and 
thereby enter into privilege and statuory regulation. They purchase 
insurance from an insurance company. (another corporation, another 
contract, compelled by statute) They have transfered responsibility 
of their actions to that corporation, thereby limiting their 
liability and risk for their actions. Now, if they cause a loss or 
injury to another, they are not responsible for the loss or injury 
they have caused, the insurance company is. 
Because they have moved from status to contract, such individuals 
are no longer free, but have become juristic and subject to the 
statutory or regulatory law of state which governs the corporation. 
That law, in this case, is Title ^1 U.C.A. and the sections under which 
the Defendant was charged. They are now "subject to the law" of the 
sovereign ie. the state, as the Prosecutor so eloquently claims. 
Such persons no longer claim certain rights and immunities, for they 
have exchanged certain capacities, duties, and responsibilities for 
privilege and limited liability. They have in effect, become the 
very creatures which the legislature attempts to define as "person" 
in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t), by including "natural persons" in the 
definition. 
The Defendant would contend that what Bouvier defines as a 
natural person, is different from the intent and meaning of what a 
natural person is in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t). 
The Defendant contends that the legislature included "natural 
persons" in the enabling statute of Title kl U.C.A., because 
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corporations, etc. cannot themselves travel on the highways. Only 
human beings are capable, at this time, of being able to operate and 
control vehicles driven by internal combustion engines, or the like. 
Certain human beings, which comprise the body and function of 
corporations, must of necessity and nature, be the ones who "drive'1 
on the highways. The Defendant would contend that it is "members" 
and other "human beings" who are juristic in nature, which are 
intended to be defined in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t), and not "natural 
persons." Natural persons have rights, and Title M , U.C.A. does 
not recognize rights as they apply to the Defendant. 
The Defendant again contends that even though he is a natural 
person, he is not a person as defined by U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t). 
That section,only applies to persons in a corporate capacity andj 
cannot bring him into the jurisdiction of the Motor Vehicle Code. 
To alter his status by such legislative gymnastics, in an effort to 
compel him to the specific performance required in order for him to 
enjoy his right to travel, is to substantially deprive him of his 
Freedom, his Liberty, his Property, and his accountability to his 
God. 
The Defendant has not waived his Right to travel, nor has he 
consented to be regulated. Implied consent cannot apply in this case. 
The Defendant is not engaged in trade, commerce, business, or industry, 
nor does he use the highway in an extraordinary way. That is to say, 
he does not affect the Public interest. The legislature does not 
have the capacity to alter or change the status of the Defendant 
without his consent, just as it cannot make the Defendant a banker, 
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a contractor, or a doctor by simply legislating him to be such. 
Therefore, enforcement of Title hi U.C.A. on the Defendant is not 
valid. Title 4l U.C.A. may be constitutional when applying it to 
corporate status. However, when the agents of the King use the same 
statute to compel the Defendant to a specific performance, that 
statute is unconstitutional in nature, and the Defendant challenges 
it as such. 
In this respect, the Justice Court lacked the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate this matter. 
RIGHTS 
The Rights of the Defendant is the central issue of the cause 
before this Court on appeal. The Defendant contends that his rights 
are what grant him immunity from prosecution of these charges, and 
therefore the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction. The Defendant has 
previously described his status as a Freeman, and he is entitled to 
full consideration of his rights when any law is applied to him. 
lAi'hen a law works in such a capacity as to compel a specific performance 
of the Defendant as a natural person, that law is outside its 
application as pertains to the Defendant, and the Justice Court 
cannot simply assume jurisdiction in an effort to prove to the 
Defendant that its not nice to challenge a Judge's jurisdiction. To 
simply assert that all laws are applicable to everyone is such an 
absurdity, the Defendant finds it almost unworthy to address. Equally 
as absurd is the grandiose statement of the Prosecutor that, "we're 
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all subject to these laws." (transcript p. 192) Unless of course, 
the Prosecutor meant that we are all subject to constitutional laws. 
Title kl U.C.A. does not recognize the rights of a natural 
person, and in that respect it does not recognize constitutional 
law, of which it is subject to. (U.S. Constitution, Article VI 
para. 2) As previously explained, it recognizes, and therefore 
operates only at corporate capacity. That is, a capacity which 
operates at privilege and is therefore regulated by the state. 
The Defendant does not operate at privilege. He travels as a 
matter of Right. He has not caused injury to another, and no such 
claim has been alledged in this action. No corpus delecti exists, 
nor is there any cause of action other than simple allegations that 
the Defendant did not specifically perform. Does such law as Title 
M U.C.A. propounds, delineate the rights of the Defendant while 
attempting to compel him to a specific performance? NO! Who can 
compel this Free person to do anything, where by the course of his 
own free action he does not infringe on the rights of others? 
LIBERTY 
The Defendant claims his right to travel under the liberty-
clause of the Constitution of the United States, Ammendment V, and 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 1. Such 
right to travel includes the unrestrained use of the highway. 
HIGHWAY: A passage, road, or street which every citizen 
(person) has a right to use. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 9^ 0 
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The highway was not created for the purposes of the state, nor 
can the state claim to own it. It existed long before the creation 
of the state. The state was created to secure and protect the rights 
of the Citizens to use the highway for their ordinary business. The 
Defendant of course, is not implying that this was the sole purpose 
for creating government, but only to point out that highways are as 
ancient as man himself, and is is one means through which he 
exercises his liberty, which the state (ie. government) is bound to 
protect. 
LIBERTY: Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, 
and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence 
from without. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1^38 
Liberty is one of the three great subdivisions of civil rights. 
Its intent and meaning, as shown by definition, is clear and 
understandable. This Country was founded on the basis that all men 
were to be allowed the free exercise of it. The Declaration of 
Independance tells us that governments are instituted among men to 
secure and protect it. (addendum #^ ) Utah's own Declaration of 
Rights, Article I, Section 1 confirms Liberty as a right which all 
men have. In addition: 
PERSONAL LIBERTY: Consists in the power of locomotion, 
of changing situation, of removing one's person to whatever 
place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or 
restraint unless by due course of law. Bouvierfs Law 
Dictionary, p. 1965 
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What is here defined as "personal liberty", is plain and simple 
doctrine. The Constitution guarantees it, and the Defendant claims 
it. The question therefor becomes; how much Liberty does the 
Defendant possess as a right, and how much Liberty can his government 
take away from him, and under what conditions, while protecting that 
right. 
This situation reminds the Defendant of a legend in Norse 
mythology. It seems that Loki, the brother to Thor, had been 
sentenced to death as a consequence of his mischievousness. He was 
however, granted one request from Odin, the Father of all. Loki's 
request was, that since he was to lose his head, no portion of his 
neck was to be taken with it. The executioner could not determine 
where Loki's neck stopped and where his head began. Consequently 
Loki kept his neck and his head, as Odin's promise to Loki was the 
law.
 ; 
This same principle must of necessity apply when considering 
the rights of the Defendant. Since such rights are absolute, the 
smallest effort to infringe on them works to deprive them from the 
Defendant. Whether that right be liberty, property, due process, 
counsel, jury, or whatever, when a law works as an infringement on 
a right of an individual, the right must prevail in all cases. Is 
this not why, in the Miranda case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, 
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate 
them." Miranda v Arizona, J8k U.S. ^ 36, ^ 91 
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The Defendant of course, recognizes that Miranda was a murder 
case, and the case now before this Court is a traffic case. The issue 
of rights remains the same however, and the Defendant does not 
believe the four-square rule necessarily applies. 
Rights are just that! Rights! Many men have fought and died 
for them. The Defendant himself has lost his liberty, 23 days in 
jail in this case, by fighting for them. The question this Court 
must decide is how much Liberty, ie. right to travel, does the 
Defendant possess as a Right, and at what point does government 
infringe on that Right. Then, under what conditions can the 
Defendant lose all or any portion of that Right? 
The Defendant contends that he possesses all of his rights of 
Liberty, and that traveling is a part of Liberty which cannot be 
deprived him without due course of law. Simple legislative enactment 
of a statute is not due course of law, and does not comprise 
sufficient grounds to restrain the Defendant from the free exercise 
of his personal liberty, and his freedom to travel by the conveyance 
of the day. 
PROPERTY 
PROPERTY: The sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe. 2 Black's Commentary 2 
The Defendant claims his absolute right to ownership of property. 
That property in this case being, the conveyance of the day. 100 
years ago it might have been a horse drawn wagon. 100 years from 
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now it might be a solar powered flitter. Today, it happens to be 
a pick-up truck powered by an internal combustion engine. Whatever 
it is, the Defendant claims absolute ownership of it. It is his in 
allodial freehold, or fee simple if you will. Whatever you wish to 
call it, no one else claims an interest in it, nor can they. The 
Defendant paid for it, exchanging substance for substance. No debt 
was incured in the transaction, with all parties being satisfied. 
The right of property includes the ability to use, possess, 
enjoy, and dispose of it. This Court said as much in the McGrew case. 
"Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy 
and dispose of a thing, the term often being used to indicate 
the res or subject of the property, rather than the property 
itself. 
Property embraces all valuable interests which a man may 
possess outside of himself, that is to say, outside of his life 
and liberty. It is not confined to mere tangible property, but 
extends to every species of vested right. McGrew ,v. Industrial 
Comm., 96 U. 203, 85 P. 2nd 608 
The Defendant claims that Title M U.C.A. does not contemplate 
the rights of property as applied to him. It contemplates property 
as a privilege granted by the legislature. This is in direct 
conflict with property as a right, as indicated in the McGrew case 
The Defendant contends that equally as important to his right 
to travel, is his right to use his property in the exercise of his 
right to travel on the highway. 
Title kl U.C.A. does not contemplate the Defendants1 rights of 
property, and therefor are unconstitutional when enforced against him. 
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property, and therefor are unconstitutional when enforced against him. 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
No statute can be constitutional, when through its enforcment, 
the executive & judicial branches of government can run slipshod 
over the Defendant while systematically denying due process of law. 
The denial of due process substantially affects the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and the ultimate outcome. The improprieties of the agents 
of the King in denying due process to the Defendant were blantent 
and contrived through the machinations of the Prosecutor, Judge, & 
Police Officers, (record, pp. 56-65, 126-128, 139-1^2, 1^5-156) 
The Defendant was not read his Miranda rights at the alledged 
scene of the crime. That fact was' easily controverted in the trial 
de novo once the two arresting officers were appraised of their 
mistake. They didn't have to account to the Justice of the Peace, 
as he was not about to rule on any issue of constitutionallity. 
With no record at the Justice Court level, the lack of the Miranda 
rights was no issue for the Defendant in the District Court. 
The Defendant demanded counsel at the alledged scene of the 
crime, and the officers refused to secure counsel for him. 
The Defendant's property was seized without warrant, and never 
used as evidence. The taking of the Defendant's property was done 
with the intention of punishing the Defendant for some crime he had 
not yet been convicted of. He is still being, punished at this time. 
This is in violation of the Defendant's right against punishment 
before conviction, pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-1-4. (addendum #5) 
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In addition, the Justice of the Peace the in ordered that the 
Defendant's property be held as ransom, requiring the Defendant, should 
he pay the ransom, to be subject to greater penalties than allowable 
by law. (Title 76, Chapter 3, part 3, addendum # 6 
The Defendant was not properly arraigned before the Justice 
of the Peace, pursuant to Rules 10 & 11, U.R.Cr. P. Furthermore, 
he was not advised of his Rights. In addition, the complaint brought 
a* 
against the Defendant was brought %n hearsay ^ ¥idonoe, and not by the 
complaining officers. 
When the Defendant demanded counsel of his choice, he was 
denied his counsel and ordered to accept alternate counsel, or the 
Justice of the Peace was going to waive his counsel. This the 
Judge did. Whoftthe Defendant advised the Justice Court that he 
would not waive his right to counsel, the Judge immediately ordered 
the Defendant incarcerated. This violates the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling in the Argersinger case. 
"We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intellegent 
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether 
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial." 
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know 
when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may 
be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused 
is' represented by counsel." Argersinger v Hamlin, Sheriff, 
^07 u.s. 25 
The Justice of the Peace was well advised of this ruling and 
chose to ignore it, as did the District Court Judge. (record pp.56 -
61, 
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The Justice of the Peace consistently did not understand the 
various arguments of the Defendant, and sought advice and counsel 
from the Prosecutor, who was also the attorney for the City of 
Salina. This substantially affected the setting of the Court, and 
the proper roles of the Judge and the Prosecutor. 
The Justice of the Peace allowed the Prosecutor to voi dire the 
jury with his own questioning without interruption, until he was done. 
After the Defendant began his questioning of the prospective jurors, 
the Justice of the Peace stopped the procedings of jury voi dire, 
when it became evident that there was obvious predjudice and 
formulated opinions of the prospective jurors, to the detriment of 
the Defendant, and he was requiring the removal of prejudicial 
prospective jurors for cause. After three prospective jurors had 
been removed for cause, the Justice of the Peace refused to allow 
the Defendant to question any more prospective jurors. The Justice 
of the Peace then asked questions of a general nature of the 
prospective jurors himself. This did not allow equal protection to 
the Defendant by allowing him the same considerations that had been 
granted to the Prosecutor. 
The Defendant was denied his opportunity to present his full 
and complete testimony to the Court. On several occations during 
his testimony, the Justice of the Peace threatened the Defendant 
with contempt charges based on the testimony he was presenting while 
being a witness in his own behalf. In addition, the Justice of the 
Peace kept ordering under threat of contempt, the Defendant to give 
testimony he was not capable of giving, or which would deny him his 
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The Justice of the Peace did not observe and follow Rule 19(b), 
U.R.Cr. P. (addendum #7 ) He simply threw away the Defendant's 
jury instructions. The Defendant filed 26 jury instructions with the 
Court. Evidence of the Judge's actions can be found in the fact that 
they are not contained in the docket the Justice of the Peace is 
required to forward to the District Court on appeal. 
These matters of due process are not to indicate that they are 
the only issues which were denied to the Defendant. There were more. 
However, space and memory are restrictive factors. In addition, much 
of what happened to the Defendant in the Justice Court was merely-
repeated in the District Court. If the Justice Court cannot or 
will not observe and protect the rights of due process to the Defendant, 
then it must not be a duly constituted Court of this State, and must 
not have had the jurisdiction to try this matter. 
PRIVACY 
The Defendant would contend that Title M U.C.A. does not 
recognize nor contemplate the rights of the Defendant. In particular, 
it violates his privacy as guaranteed under Article I, Section 14, 
Utah State Constitution. 
The application for a driver's license in particular, requires 
certain information about the Defendant which is private in nature. 
And, when the license certificate issues, it contains a major 
portion of such private information. The Defendant finds no com-
pelling need for any person, organization, or government entity to 
have such information, and to make application for, or to receive a 
license would waive any objection to disclosure of said information. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's Brief - page 28 
Title M U.C.A. further violates said privacy by compelling 
the specific performance of the individual who is in possession of 
such a license certificate, to offer up such evidence at the demand 
of a Peace Officer. (Section lH-2-15 U.C.A., addendum #8) 
The Defendant readily agrees that the individual who is in 
possession of a driver's license issued by the state can be compelled 
to present it on demand, even though it violates said right to 
privacy. 
The Defendant understands that when application is made, and 
the license is received, the individual doing such, waives certain 
rights and consents to regulation and privilege. He waives any 
immunity he may have possessed as a natural person, and becomes a 
subject, being subject to the statute. Implied consent comes into 
effect, and therefor works on that individual to require a specific 
performance, even to his detriment by requiring him to become a 
witness against himself, proffering to the agent of the King, 
evidence, which can then be used against him. 
The Defendant however, does not consent to such a waiver of 
his rights to privacy, nor does he waive his right to be protected 
against being a witness, or self-incrimination. 
The Defendant contends that the requirement to obtain a driver's 
license in order to exercise his right to travel is a violation of 
his right to privacy, and such a violation of his rights through 
statutory law invalidates that law, and therefor the Justice Court 
lacked jurisdiction. . 
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SUBJECT MATTER OF TITLE *H U.C.A. 
Title 4l of the Utah Code, and more specifically, those sections 
under which the Defendant has been convicted, act directly on him as 
if a contract exists which attempts to compel him to a specific 
performance. In relation to such constructive, law is the compulsion 
by distraint upon the Defendant, to either submit to the jurisdiction 
of the statutes in order to enjoy his God given agency, or suffer the 
enforcment penalties of fines and imprisonment for the free exercise 
thereof. 
The subject matter of Title kl U.C.A., attempts to prevent the 
commission of some imaginary crime before that crime actually exists. 
Such an imaginary crime, if projected forward to a physical existance, 
might take the form of some automotive accident, wherein someone would 
suffer a loss in some degree of life, liberty, or property. 
What indicia is required to constitute a "crime"? A crime 
wherein an individual who commits the heinous act of traveling 
throughout the land without his "papers" being in order, that he must 
for the general safety and welfare of the people be put away behind 
bars and locked doors, to be shut out of sight and mind. 
The Defendant, in his admitedly limited capacity, has not been 
able to pinpoint, or directly list the necessary indicia that 
constitutes such a "crime". The Defendant has only been able to 
determine the following elements that would necessarily constitute a 
"crime" at law. 
1. The occurance of loss or injury. 
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2. Criminal causation of that loss or injury. 
3. The identity of the perpetrator. 
Title M , U.C.A., works at a jurisdiction foreign to the 
Defendant, as he is a natural person as previously described. He is 
not encumbered by any contract that would enter him into admiralty or 
any other equity or chancery jurisdiction. Title M , U.C.A. works to 
prevent the cause of some imaginary crime, and does not work as 
punishment to a crime. 
The facts of this case are clear and they show that the Defendant 
has not caused any loss or injury to another. (transcript pp. 123 & 12*4, 
125 & 126, 130, 132) 
The common argument opposed to this concept is that the legislature 
of the state has passed law and it has been signed into law by the 
state executive. The law (it is more correctly termed lex) exists, 
and therefor it is prima facia evidence that a crime has been committed 
on the face of the complaint. It may be prima facia evidence, but that 
is only until it is challenged, as in this case. 
Where is the body? Where is the crime? To simply say that the 
law (lex?) exists, and the complaint is brought forth, therefore the 
corpus delecti is established is HOGWASH! That is a fiction of law! 
Title M , U.C.A. acts as a penal statute. That may not be what 
the State of Utah calls it, but it is a penal statute just the same. 
PENAL STATUTES: Penal statutes are essentially those 
actions which impose a penalty or punishment arbitrarily extracted 
for some act or commission thereof on the part of some person. 
Such statutes operate to compel a performance. Black1s Law 
Dictionary, 5th Ed., pp. 1019, 1020 
"...and inflict a punishment by statute 
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The Defendant has repeatedly argued that Title 4l and the 
particular sections under which he was charged with violating, work 
to compel a specific performance. What then, is specific performance? 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The actual performance of a contract 
by the party bound to fulfil it. Bouvierfs, p. 3100 
By applying reason, logic, and common sense, one can well under-
stand that what the state is really trying to do, is bind the Defendant 
to the obligation of a contract. The Defendant must ask, what contract? 
Where is this contract? Who negotiated it? The Defendant would offer 
to this Court that such a contract might be articles of incorporation, 
an insurance policy, a bank loan for property to be used on a highway, 
a motor vehicle title, a motor vehicle registration, a bill of laden, 
or maybe, just maybe a driver's license. In any event, any instrument 
which would bind upon a person to compel a specific performance. 
There is no such instrument in existance, where the Defendant is 
concerned. 
In any case, with the violation of such a penal statute, comes 
a penal action. 
PENAL ACTIONS: Actions brought in England under a statute 
forbidding or requiring an act to be done and rendering an 
offender liable to pay a sum of money to be recovered from him 
in a civil action. Thev are not criminal actions. Bouvier's, 
p. 2551 
What? They are not criminal actions? My! My! My! 
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Could this be one reason why so many states have converted their 
motor vehicle statutes to infractions and civil actions, rather than 
sending a man to jail for 6 months because he doesn't have a driver's 
license? (as in this case) "What kind of human beings are we? It 
isn't a crime to not have a driver's license, and Title M , U.C.A. 
stretches beyond its jurisdiction to compel a specific performance 
upon a natural person who exists at law. As the Defendant has 
stated before, the statute itself may work on those who are juristic 
in nature, and have consented to regulation and privilege. The 
Defendant however, is unenfranchised, and to convict him of a "crime", 
a "crime" must have been committed. As no "crime" was ever shown to 
exist by statute, nor was a "crime" ever shown to have been committed 
by the Defendant in this case, the lower Court did err in exercising 
jurisdiction in this case. 
SELF IMPOSED DENIAL OF JURISDICTION 
The Justice of the Peace, Thad toasden, consistantly refused to 
consider any questions involving an issue concerning the Constitution 
of the United States, or the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Various issues were raised in the course of the pre-trial procedings 
challenging the validity of the statutes, and rights of the Defendant, 
as has been shown in forgoing argument in this brief. Having no 
record of the Justice Court procedings, the Defendant calls attention 
to the pleadings of the Defendant contained in the record. (record 
pp. 11-13, 56-59, 60-65, 67-75, 95-123, 126-127, 137-157) 
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In every instance where the Defendant called for a decision of 
the Justice Court to determine his Constitutionally protected rights, 
or make a determination of a statute, the Judge would first consult 
with his legal counsel, (the prosecutor) and then follow his 
counsil's advice or refuse to rule. Of course the prosecutor was 
not about to give the Justice of the Peace any advice which would 
assist him to rule in favor of the Defendant. 
On numerous occasions, the Justice of the Peace stated, "I 
will not rule on any issue concerning the Constitution." 
Article IV, Section 10 of the Utah State Constitution sa;ys that 
every person taking a public office shall take or subscribe an oath 
to uphold, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States, 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
If Thad Wasden did in fact swear to such an oath, then his 
determination to not rule on any issue of Constitutionality would 
be in violation of his oath of office, and a self imposed limitation 
on the duties of his office. Such a limitation on himself would 
therefore deny any person appearing before him the opportunity to be 
heard by a constitutionally bound judge, and in fact, such a judge 
would voluntarily be setting aside his mantle of judgeship. Such an 
action by a Justice of the Peace, or any Judge of this State, would 
automatically invalidate the jurisdiction of that court. 
With the self admited refusal to rule on, or allow any argument 
concerning a Constitutional issue presented before him, Thad Wasden, 
the Justice of the Peace of Salina City, lacked the jurisdiction to 
even hear the matter now before this Court. 
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THAD WASDEN IS NOT A DULY SWORN JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 
Without going into great detail to conserve his space for 
argument in this brief, the Defendant has considerable reason to 
believe that Thad Wasden is not a sworn public official under Article 
IV, Section 10 of the Utah State Constitution. The Defendant has 
petitioned on several occasions for proof of Thad Wasden's oath 
of office. He was conveniently brushed off by the Salina City 
recorder, and was finally advised that he was not entitled to it, 
and the City of Salina need not provide him with a copy of it. 
This was made on the advice of the Salina City attorney, the prosecutor 
in this case. If Thad Wasden is not a sworn Justice of the Peace, 
then he lacked jurisdiction in this case, and the Defendant was 
tried unlawfully. 
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POINT #2 DOES ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW? 
Article I, Section 12 grants to an accused person "the right 
to appeal in all cases." Article I, Section 2k declares that all 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, outlines the 
forum for review that is sought on appeal. In case appealed from 
District, Circuit, or Juvenile Corts, a forum is provided whereby 
the decisions, rulings, and orders are reviewed by the appellate 
court. Such is not the case in an appeal from the Justice Court. 
(addendum #9) 
U.C.A. 77-35-26(K) indicates that an appeal from the Justice to the 
District Court comes only by way of a new trial. In this light, 
should the appellant from a Justice Court have issues to raise 
concerning jurisdiction, judicial improprieties, mishandling of the 
case, lack of due process, objections to jury, objections to jury 
instructions, deprivation of any rights, or any other consideration 
that would normally be considered on an "appeal of right" from the 
District, Circuit, or Juvenile Courts, he is denied his forum for 
review of that court on appeal. His only forum is a new trial, 
which gives to the prosecution all of the defense and strategies 
an accused person may have, in which case, the prosecution may then 
move to ammend an incorrect information, alter an alledged charge 
(as with this case), and work with the witnesse to alter or change 
testimony pertinant to the innocence of the accused. 
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All strategies & defenses are lost to an accused person who 
must accept a trial de novo as his only recourse to appeal. In 
addition, there is no record available from the Justice Court he 
appeals from. 
What the Defendant in this case raises in his issue, is that 
appealing from the Justice to the District Court, he is denied his 
forum for review. The forum that exists in appeals from all other 
courts in this state, and even from administrative agencies of this 
state, is denied to him because he is forced to accept a trial de 
novo only. This problem is then compounded should the defendant 
seek review to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Article VIII, 
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution (I896) limits what issues 
the Supreme Court can hear on appeal, when an appeal comes to the 
Supreme Court having originated in the Justice Court. 
The Defendant, having been denied a forum for review of the 
Justice Court procedings by being forced into a trial de novo in the 
District Court, is again denied his forum for review of the District 
Court procedings in the Supreme Court should he need to raise an 
issue of controversy arising from the District Court. As in this 
case, should the defendant, on appeal to the Supreme Court, not raise 
a challenge to the validity or constitutionality of the statute, he 
could not appeal to the Supreme Court of any malfeasance in the 
District Court; ie. the District Court denied the Defendant a 
constitutionally comprised 8 man jury. (Article I, Section 10,., 
Utah State Constitution. 
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Consequently, the District Court does not have to provide for 
the Defendant his forum for review on appeal from the Justice Court. 
In fact, the way is laid open for unaccountable corruption. The 
Justice of the Peace is not acountable for his actions in the Court-
room as there is no recourd of the procedings. The District Court 
Judge is not accountable for his actions in the Courtroom as the 
accused cannot appeal any higher. This confounds justice, and 
denies the Defendant his right to appeal. That right to appeal 
being the same forum for review as provided to other appellants from 
other courts in this state. 
In light of the previous decisions of this Court in its rulings 
in the Taylor, Munger, and Christiensen cases (State v. Taylor, Utah, 
66^ P2d ^39 (1983); State v. Munger, Utah, 642 P2d 721 (1982); 
State v. Christensen, 13 Utah Advance Reports 3 (1985)i Article VIII, 
Section 9> Utah State Constitution (1896) violates the right of 
equal protection and the uniform application of the laws of this 
state, to the Defendant. He has not been provided an adequate forum 
for review of his case. He has been slam-banged around with everyone 
pretending that justice has been served, when no one will consider 
what the police officers, prosecutor, and judges have done to deny 
him his counsel, jury, due process, and other rights. The Defendant 
has a right to equal protection, and he has a right :o a forum for 
review of his case. 
The Defendant was not granted a forum to consider whether the 
Officers gave him a lawful order. There was no forum to consider 
whether the Justice of the Peace or the Police officers denied him 
council, before he was incarcerated. There is no forum to consider 
"t~ In e* T n v» "w inG-(-r>n^-|-i AV^CI +- "h y\ T i m + i ^ ^ ^ -P -+- "U .-* *n ~ ^  — ~ -»- -u ,~ - _ 
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There is no forum to review the decision of the District court to 
deny the Defendant an 8 man jury, or its decision to incarcerate the 
Defendant because he was forced to represent himself in the trial 
de novo. (transcripts not provided) There is no forum to review 
the Defendant's jury instructions that were not given in the District 
Court trial. 
Indeed, where lies the forum to review the action of the District 
Court to bring a new charge on the Defendant, when he is in that 
court on review of other charges? A trial de novo is a re-trial, 
yet the District Court created a new offense and a new trial. The 
Defendant was never arraigned on that new charge, tohere then lies 
the Defendant's forum to review that action in the District Court? 
Without a forum for review of the entire case, the Defendant 
is not granted the same protection that is granted to other appellants, 
and this Court should reverse the decision of the Justice Court. 
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POINT #3 WAS THE APPELLANT GIVEN A LAWFUL ORDER PURSUANT TO U.C.A 
SECTION 41-6-13, FOR WHICH HE COULD BE CHARGED WITH FAILING 
TO OBEY? 
The Defendant-Appellant is at a loss as to how to argue this 
issue of a lawful order. There are disputed issues of fact, and 
disputed issues of law. The Defendant wishes to present the issues 
of fact so that the issue of law may be decided. 
To decide whether or not the Defendant was given a lawful order, 
this Court must first decide what order was given. It must then 
decide whether or not that order was lawful in accordance with U.C.A. 
section 41-6-13 (addendum #10), and whether or not that section is 
applicable to the Defendant in this particular case. 
The Defendant claims that he was first ordered to show his driver's 
license, and that he refused, claiming the protection of Constitutional 
immunity. The police report bears out the fact that a driver's 
license was first demanded of the Defendant, and that he claimed 
Constitutional protection. The Police officer (Charles R. Woodside) 
placed the Defendant under arrest at that time, and thereafter ordered 
him from the vehicle. (record pp. 50, 51) (addendum #11) The police 
report bears out the fact that the Defendant was placed under arrest 
by officer Woodside before there was any effort to ask or remove him 
from his vehicle. 
The Defendant would contend that the only order given by officer 
Woodside, that could be construed as lawful, was to demand a driver's 
license of the Defendant. 
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When officer, Gordon Kiesel, appeared on the scene he too asked 
for the Defendant to show his driverfs license. The Defendant again 
invoked his Constitutional protection to privacy. Officer Kiesel then 
told the Defendant that he was under arrest and to, "get out of the 
vehicle". The Defendant then asked what he was under arrest for. 
Officer Kiesel said that the Defendant was under arrest for failing 
to obey the lawful order of a police officer, when the Defendant 
asked the officer what the lawful order was that Officer Kiesel had 
given him, Officer Kiesel said that he (the Defendant) had failed 
to display his driver's license on demand. 
The testimony of the two officers in the Justice Court was that 
the "lawful" order given to the Defendant at the alledged scene of 
the crime, was to display his driver's license. (addendums #12 & #13) 
On appeal to the District Court, the Defendant claimed to not 
have a Utah driver's license, and therefore the police officers could 
not lawfully order the Defendant to do that which was physically 
impossible for him to do. 
In the District Court trial, both police officers attempted to 
change their testimony implying that the lawful order given to the 
Defendant was to step out of the vehicle, and for the Defendant to 
put his hands behind his head. (transcript pp. 60-62, 90-91) 
As there is no record of the testimony given in the Justice Court, 
the Defendant can only rely on the eye-witness accounts of those 
procedings, and his own testimony as to what the lawful order was that 
the officers testified to. Also, the police report shows that the 
Defendant was arrested before being asked from the vehicle. 
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The first issue for this Court to decide would be whether the 
lawful order given, which the Defendant was charged with failing to 
obey was, 
a. display a driver's license or; 
b. get out of your vehicle, and put your hands behind your head. 
If this Court determines that the order given to the Defendant 
for which he was charged with failing to obey was to display a 
driver's license, then was that order applicable to the Defendant 
wherein he was totally incapable of obeying such an order? Not only 
was the Defendant not able to display a driver's license, but he was 
also not able to display registration for the vehicle, or a safety 
inspection sticker, as the vehicle was not registered to the Defendant, 
nor was it registered in the State of Utah. All of these facts were 
clearly presented in this case. 
In this case, the Defendant is not a licensee within the meaning 
of U.C.A. section M-2-15* wherein it states: 
"The licensee shall have his license in his immediate 
possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall 
display the same upon demand of a ....peace officer..." 
The Defendant would concede that pursuant to that section of the 
Utah Code, there are persons to which that section applies. And, 
that when a peace officer demands a license to be displayed, the 
licensee must comply. Not being a licensee, the Defendant can no 
more be ordered by a peace officer to display such, than to be ordered 
to pull a rabbit out of his hat, or to produce for the peace officer a 
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$20 gold piece. Therefor, to charge the Defendant with failure to 
comply with such an order that the Defendant was not capable of comply-
ing with is unjust, and not within the scope of the police officerfs 
authority. 
If this Court determines that the Defendant was charged for 
failing to obey the order to "get out of the vehicle", and "to put 
you hands behind you head", then this Court must look to the 
construction of U.C.A. section 41-6-13, and determine whether those 
orders can be construed to be "lawful" within the meaning of that 
section of the Code. (see addendum #10) 
To ask someone to step out of his vehicle, as the police report 
indicates, does not sound like an order. Let us suppose that the 
officers didn't ask, but demanded "get out of the vehicle." Where 
is the nexus between such an order, and the direction, control, or 
regulation of traffic, other than this was a routine traffic stop? 
Two (2) possibilities arise. Either the police officers were acting 
to safeguard the public, or pursuant to an arrest. The Defendant was 
not under the influence of alcholhol or drugs, nor had he been acting 
in a wreckless manner. The officers did not indicate that they had 
been seeking to protect the public safety, so they must have ordered 
the Defendant out of his vehicle, pursuant to a prior arrest. 
If "get out of your vehicle" was a lawful order, why did the 
officers order the Defendant out of his vehicle? Was that order 
directing, controling, or regulating traffic? Did they order him 
out of his vehicle, then arrest him? Did they arrest him first, then 
order him out of his vehicle, then claim that he failed to obey a 
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The Defendant was stopped for a broken headlight, and broken 
taillights. The Defendant, when stopped, parked off the highway so 
his vehicle was not interfering with the flow of other vehicles on 
the highway. Why would the officers demand that the Defendant exit 
his vehicle, and claim that as a lawful order to arrest him, then 
charge him pursuant to that section of the Code? 
The Defendant would contend that a police officer does not have 
the authority under section 41-6-13 to simply order people out of 
their vehicle without cause. There is no evidence in this case that 
the officers had cause unless the Defendant's first argument on this 
point is accepted, and the Defendant was already under arrest before 
he was ordered from his vehicle. If the Defendant's first argument 
is accepted, the Defendant did not fail to comply, he was not capable 
of complying with the order for which he was charged with not obeying. 
In addition, failure to obey the order to M X display a driver'.; 
license was a redundant charge on the Defendant, as he was already 
charged with failure to display a driver's license to the police 
officer under U.C.A. section 41-2-15. (addendum #8) 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
The only conclusion to be drawn in this case is that the 
Defendant was punished for attempting to exercise his constitutional 
rights. The police officers, Gordon Kiesel and Charles Woodside, 
the Justice of the Peace, Thad Wasden, and the District Court Judge, 
Don Tibbs, bent over backwards to ram the defendant through the 
judicial system to bring him to justice. The Defendant has had his 
rights violated right from the beginning. Deprivation of counsel c j^ ry 
being among the most serious. It is apparent that throughout the 
entire procedings, that the Defendant's efforts to obtain constitutional 
immunity for the protection of his privacy, self incrimination, and 
rights to appeal, only angered his adversaries. And yes, the Justice 
of the Peace, and the District Court judge were his adversaries, as 
indicated by the record. 
The points presented clearly indicate that this Court must 
heavily weigh the actions of the lower courts, the denial of due 
process, and the application of the statutes on the Defendant. 
WHEREFORE: The Defendant respectifully requests oral argument, 
and prays the Court to reverse the decision of the Justice Court based 
on the argument contained herein, and award to the Appellant costs 
of this action, and particularly the heavy financial burden this 
appeal has placed on him. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
Title ^1, Chapter 1, Motor Vehicle Act 
Article 1, Words and Phrases Defined 
41-1-1, Definitions. 
(t) "Person." Every natural person, firm, copartnership, 
association, or corporation. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED , 1953 as ammended 
68-3-12, Rules of construction as to these statutes. 
(5) The word "person" includes bodies politic and corporate, 
partnerships, associations and companies. 
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"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this 
particular between an individual and a corporation, and a corporation, 
and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and 
papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual 
may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled 
to cary on his private business in his own way. His power to contract 
is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to 
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so 
far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the 
State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of 
his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of 
the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only 
be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the 
Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, 
and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure 
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public 
so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." 
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. ^ 3, at p. 7^ 
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"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their .just powers from the consent of the governed." 
Declaration of Independence, (emphasis added) 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
77-l-^i Conviction to precede punishment. 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted 
in a court having jurisdiction. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
76-3-3OI, Fines of persons. 
(k) $299 when the conviction is of a class B or C misdemeanor 
or infraction. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
77-35-19." Rule 19 - Instructions. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, 
the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If 
part be given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing 
by the endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part 
was refused. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
41-2-15- License to be carried when driving - Production in court. 
The licensee shall have his license in his immediate possession 
at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the same 
upon demand of a justice of peace, a peace officer or a field deputy 
or inspector of the department. It shall be a defense to any charge 
under this subsection that the person so charged produce in court an 
operator1s license theretofore issued to such person and valid at the 
time of his arrest. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
77-35-26. Rule 26 - Appeals. 
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment 
rendered in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this 
rule, except as follows: 
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and 
the decision of the district court shall be final except in cases 
where the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is 
raised in the justice court; 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended 
41-6-13- Obedience to police officer. 
No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful 
order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority 
to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
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EXCERPT TAKEN FROM SALINA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT COMPLAINT REPORT 
Record pp. 50, 51 
"R/P got into the patrolcar and proceded to the Chevron station. 
R/P at that time asked the driver for his drivers license and registra-
tion." 
"The driver advised R/P that unless R/P had a 4th amendment warrent 
R/P couldfnt (SIC) see his drivers license. R/P asked the driver 
several times to produce his drivers license and registration and the 
driver gave the same answer. "Not without a fourth amendment warrent". 
"R/P then advised the driver he was being stopped for only having 
1 head lamp, no tail lights, no Utah registration and no safety inspec-
tion. R/P then asked the driver for his drivers license and registra-
tion." 
"The driver again refused to produce his drivers license and 
registration and then ask R/P if he was under arrest." 
"R/P again asked him to show his drivers license and registration 
and again he refused and stated to the effect that it was his 
constitutional rights to drive and without a 4th amendment warrent he 
would show R/P nothing." 
"At this R/P advised the driver he was under arrest and asked 
him to step out of the vehicle." 
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JOSEPH M. WISDEN 
FREEMAN 
950 N. 1350 ^ est 
Section 35, Township 6 South, Range 2 East 
Utah County, Utah 84604 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
)ITY OF SALINA 
vs 
JOSEPH M. vJISDEN 
Respondent 
Appellant 
CASE NO. 20498 
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Utah ) 
) ss. AFFIDAVIT 
I, David R. Wisden, having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of Pima County, State of Arizona, 
2. I am over 21 years of age. 
3. I was witness to the trial of Joseph M. vJisden, in the 
Justice Court of Salina City, on the l4th of May 1984. 
4. I was personally present in the Courtroom during the 
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely Charles R. 
Woodside, and Gordon Keisel, Salina City Police Officers. 
5. I heard the testimony of both officers concerning the charge 
of not complying with a lawful order, against Joseph M. hisden. 
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6. Under cross-examination, both officers testified to the 
order which they gave to Joseph M. Wisden, which they alledged he 
failed to comply with, which he was arrested for at the traffic stop 
of 24 February 1984. 
7. The order both officers testified to, that Joseph M. 
.•u'is den had been given was, "refusing to display his driver's 
license on demand of a peace officer." 
8. At the time of the trial of 14 May 1984, I was a resident 
of fampete County, Utah. 
Dated this 11th day of April, 1985. 
JCLU/^- 6JJM^I^ 
DAVID R. WISDEN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of April, 1985 
R^UTAH ^ - -^>*1«.M ' H£\ 
Residing in }\Q \JLJ . Utah 
A 
My commission expires: «"* \'" • 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE :' 
I, Joseph M. Wisden, do hereby certify that I have either 
hand delivered or mailed the appropriate number of copies of the 
foregoing document on the c O day o f February, 1986, first class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
D. MICHAEL JORGENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
143 South State Street 
Salina, Utah 84654 
Attorney for Respondent 
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Utah State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
)©5 k YAbdxA^ 
JOSEPH M. WISDEN 
t 
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